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Single-State NWFZs – a response to
 NWFZ blind spots*
By  J.Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia)
The first part of this thematic session entitled “Establishment ofthe second generation of NWFZs” has extensively touched uponthe issue of establishing group zone in North-East Asia, a region
that has many unresolved and contentious issues that could impeded
swift establishment of a NWFZ in the region. I am sure that with open-
minded approach, with perseverance, and what is most important, with
the necessary political will a NWFZ in North-East Asia could be
established, since it is in the vital interests of all the states of the region
and of global peace and stability. Since such a zone is being contemplated
in a region where there is not regional security mechanism, the zone
and its structure could form the basis of the future regional security
mechanism. I express the hope that the discussions that we are having
in Ulaanbaatar would be useful for embarking on a serious discussion of
the establishment of the zone in this important and dynamic region.
Another important, and not yet fully explored, issue of the second
generation of NWFZs is establishment of single-State nuclear-weapon-
free zones (single-State NWFZs). The norms of international relations,
both formal and implied, apply equally to all States.  With growing
integration and interdependence, regionalism is spreading, embracing
different spheres of human activity, including security of States, which
is evident by the existence of political-military alliances, permanent and
ad hoc  alignments as well as regional NWFZs. However, when it comes
to individual states, it is more difficult for them to ensure their security
than for groups of states, especially if they form part of regional groups
or alliances. Being left out of regional mechanisms for geographical,
* Presentation made at thematic session II of GPPAC/NEA 24  May,  2007, Ulaanbaatar,
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political or geo-political reasons makes them quite vulnerable to outside
pressures, especially political, military and economic pressures. The logic
of  safety in numbers  applies to nuclear issues just like to any other
issues. Individual states are more prone to pressures of nuclear-weapon
states to play some role in their geo-strategic calculation.
With expansion of regional (traditional) NWFZs, as it was pointed
out in the first half of this thematic session, the physical area of activity
of nuclear-powers is shrinking. That is why importance of individual
states, especially that are strategically situated, is increasing for them.
With the emergence of de facto nuclear powers nuclear calculations of
both de jure and de facto nuclear powers are becoming even more
complicated, requiring them to try to make use of individual States not
parties to NWFZs in their calculations.  That is why it is important that
international law and international community address the issue of such
individual (read – very vulnerable) states, the number of which is over a
dozen.
In 1975 “United Nations comprehensive study on the question of
nuclear-weapon free zones in all its aspects” when considering
composition of nuclear-weapon-free zones took due note of the cases of
individual states.  That is why the study pointed out that “obligations
relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be
assumed not only by groups of states, including entire continents or
large geographical regions, nut also by small groups of states and even
individual countries (emphasis added – J.E.)1. Furthermore, in 1976 the
UN General Assembly expressed the hope that the foregoing study –
together with the subsequent views, observations, and suggestions offered
on it – would further enhance whatever efforts a country or countries
may take concerning NWFZs and be useful in the establishment of such
zones.2
However, cold war mentality was operating more in terms of groups
of states and there was no attempt by individual states to establish single-
State NWFZs, since establishment of even group (traditional) NWFZs
in places where  strategic interests of the two superpowers were not
directly affected, was difficult, if not impossible. The few countries that
1 See UNGA, 30th Session. Official Records, document no. 27 (A/10027/add.1, p.
31). The resolution “Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zones in All Its Aspects” was adopted on 10 December, 1976
2 See paragraph 8 of UNGA resolution 31/70.
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adopted national legislation banning nuclear weapons did not go all the
way to turn their territories into NWFZs and to acquire the security
assurances of the five nuclear-weapon States (the P-5). Most probably
it was almost unimaginable during the cold war to get the P-5 to agree
to recognize a single-State NWFZ and acquire security assurances, since
establishment of even traditional zones in relatively “easy” areas was
very difficult.
In any case the cold war is over and one of the main obstacles to
establishing additional NWFZs and expanding the area of the nuclear-
free world has disappeared. However, establishing only regional
(traditional) NWFZs would leave blind spots that could tempt, nuclear
powers, when deemed strategically important or necessary, to make use
of them and place there nuclear weapons or parts thereof, or elements
of strategic nuclear systems, like the one that we are witnessing today
in even in Eastern Europe that is already part of the NATO alliance.
Though a number of countries, including New Zealand, Austria and
Mongolia have adopted ground-breaking legislation banning nuclear
weapons on their territories, the single-State NWFZ would go further
and require the nuclear-weapon States to provide the necessary security
assurances and would also create international mechanism that would
deal with the issues of monitoring and cases of violations of the status.
After the disintegration of the Soviet block, to which Mongolia
belonged and witnessed first-hand the threat of Sino-Soviet nuclear
rivalry, in September 1992 when Soviet/Russian troops were being
withdrawn, it declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and that
it would work to have that status internationally recognized.3
Bearing in mind its past experience of Soviet era, when Mongolian
territory hosted Soviet troops that had weapons of mass destruction
and the fact that these weapons could be been used in possible Sino-
Soviet confrontation that surely would have involved Mongolia and
destabilize the entire Asian region, it declared that even single States
had the right to establish NWFZs and thus benefit from the security
assurances of the P-5 and the support of the international community.
In doing so it made reference to the comprehensive study of 1975 and
UNGA resolution 31/70 mentioned above.
3 UNGA, 47th Session, 13th Meeting, Verbatim Records, document no. A/47/PV.13,
1992, p.11.
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To encourage a debate on the idea and concept of single-State
NWFZ, the Mongolian delegation at the United Nations in April 1997
introduced in the working group of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission a working paper on the principles for establishing such a
zone when it started consideration of an item entitled “Establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived
at among the States of the region concerned”.4 Though many delegates
supported Mongolia’s paper, it was decided that the issue needed to be
addressed at some later stage and that the Commission needed to focus
on establishment of regional zones. Bearing in mind the majority view,
Mongolia and its supporters agreed to postpone the consideration of the
working paper, and thus the issue of single-State NWFZ, until a later
date.5 Postponing consideration of this issue only does not resolve this
question that affects or could affect national security of almost one dozens
states and could affect the entire network of NWFZs and of the objective
of nuclear-free world as the  blind spots.
Despite the absence of legally defined concept of single-State
NWFZs, in practice there is a growing recognition of its importance, as
reflected in the declarations of support of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-
free status. Thus United Nations General Assembly has adopted 5
resolutions inviting member states to cooperate with Mongolia in
consolidating and strengthen … its nuclear-weapon-free status. The
conference of states parties to NWFZ treaties, held in Mexico in 2005
also expressed full support of Mongolia’s status, so did on a number of
occasions the ARF and other intergovernmental organizations.
Individually the major powers, including Mongolia’s immediate
neighbors Russia and China have expressed readiness to negotiate a
treaty that would institutionalize Mongolia’s status internationally.
There is growing support for Mongolia’s initiative (thus for the
creation of single-State NWFZ) within the non-governmental community
4 See UNGA document A/CN.10/195 of
5 The final report of the Disarmament Commission on the issue of “Establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the
States of the region concerned” noted in the footnote that “Owing to its unique
geographical circumstances, Mongolia has declared its nuclear-weapon-free status in order
to promote its security. This status was welcomed by the General Assembly in its
consensus resolution 53/77 D of 4 December 1998. See Official Records of UNGA.
Fifty-fourth session. Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42), p. 10.
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as well, including by GPPAC, which sees establishment of such zones
as a form of conflict prevention. GPPAC/NEA held in February 2005
saw Mongolia’s realistic approach in addressing nuclear issues involving
individual states. It called on the United Nations to “support
institutionalization of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status as a positive
example of creation of non-traditional NWFZs and thus un-tapping to
the fullest the potential of NWFZs.6
Therefore it is time to make the next logical step and institutionalize
Mongolia’s status as the first full-fledged single-State NWFZ by
concluding an international treaty to that effect (Russia and China have
indicated their readiness to take such action) with the required security
assurances from the P-57 and, as it has already been pointed out in
GPPAC/NEA regional plan for 2006-2010, to conduct a feasibility study
on creation of single-State NWFZs as part of the second wave of creation
of NWFZs that would address the issue of potential blind spots.
Creation of single-State NWFZs could also be practically useful as
the first step in establishing complicated NWFZs that involve states
that are under “nuclear umbrella” of nuclear powers and thus negotiate
from the standpoint of tactical advantage compared to other parties to
negotiations.  In such cases the state under “nuclear umbrella” could, as
interim measure and gesture of good will,  leave the “nuclear protection”
and acquire negative security assurances from the P-5. This could
facilitate the atmosphere at negotiations aimed as establishing a regional
(traditional) NWFZs.
6 See: Tokyo Agenda: Towards Creation of a Regional Mechanism for Peace. GPPAC.
Tokyo, 2006
7 In October 2000 the P-5 made joint statement on providing security assurances to
Mongolia in connection with its nuclear-weapon-free status, which underlined that their
separate statements on security assurances made in the Security Council in 1995 applied
to Mongolia. Mongolia declared that it considered their joint political statement as
manifestation of political will on the part of the P-5 and as the first important step in
institutionalizing the status.
